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Operation Allied Force: Operational Art & Task Force Hawk

By

Mark J. McKearn
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Professor Milan Vego
CMDR Jeff Barker, USN

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Abstract

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Analysts almost universally agree that below the surface, Operation Allied Force was an operation flawed in political and strategic direction that never applied the optimum means to accomplish the ill defined and constantly evolving objectives. Probability and chance played as much a role in the positive outcome as did operational design factors. It worked against a weak foe--a risk we should avoid in the future.

The strategic (political) and operational conditions never existed for the employment of Task Force Hawk as an operational maneuver force.

The systems were appropriate for conducting joint operational fire and maneuver, however the timing all but eliminated any chance of employment. Without surprise, multiple directions of attack, and a legitimate ground threat to occupy ground forces, Task Force Hawk could at best hope to achieve tactical effects.

Future Joint operations will present the same challenges experienced during

Operation Allied Force. We see many of the same in Afghanistan today. Let's hope we have learned from our "successes" of the past instead of mirroring them.

Introduction

So what's all the beef about Operation Allied Force? It's the "Way Ahead"! We won--we must have or else we wouldn't have peacekeeping troops on the ground serving in Kosovo today. In the context of U.S. global resources and forces, it was an economy of force mission in which we husbanded our ground forces while capitalizing on our superior air power and overwhelming technological advantages. Many view it as a model of efficiency from plan to execution. No conflict in history, of this magnitude, can claim zero combat fatalities. The United States led a complex coalition effort under the NATO umbrella that saw an end to the ethnic cleansing atrocities in Kosovo and ultimately the removal of Slobodan Milosevic from power. So why isn't this 78-day war destined for the "Warfare Hall of Fame?"

Not all studies of military art are recreational. For military professionals, one purpose is to learn from the successes and failures of the past. Time clearly plays a role and will ultimately effect our perspective and mold the final judgment. The American military machine tends to reinforce success and generally only attempts to change the approaches or techniques that resulted in a perceived failure. We like to stay on plan with a well-written script that doesn't ruffle the feathers of public opinion. Our institutions aren't afraid to change, but do so only when we perceive failure. After Vietnam, we introduced a

new role for our "citizen soldier's" and the mission of the Reserve Component for future wars. The United States has the worlds best equipped, resourced, and trained Special Operations Forces because we can never accept another "Desert One". The battle cry of the post Cold War military drawdown was "No more Task Force Smith's!"—a lesson gleaned from Korea following our post World War II force reductions. Past experiences have often spun notable policies such as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.

So what is the legacy of Operation Allied Force? What have we learned in the application of operational art and how will we apply it to future conflicts? On the surface it was a near flawless operation that achieved all the objectives. Yes, tactically our forces performed superbly. Was it our only course of action? Over the course of 78 days, was it the 37,000 total sorties, 14,000 strike sorties, and 23,000 bombs and missiles¹ that forced Milosevic to capitulate? What decisions led to the deployment of a 5500 soldier strong Army contingent known as Task Force Hawk? Could it, and should it have played a role as an operational maneuver force, employing operational fires at the direction of the JTF commander.

This paper is a historical case review that is not intended to argue for or against the merits of air power or whether they alone produced political results. It is rather a review of our doctrine for waging operational warfare and how it was applied to Operation Allied Force. Additionally, this paper reviews the role of Task Force Hawk in the overall operational scheme of Allied Force.

The Planning Process.

"A campaign is defined as a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a

given time and space."² Operation Allied Force was referred to as an air campaign, however in accordance with our joint doctrine it was in fact a major combined air operation. If NATO had taken a holistic approach to the Balkans, and developed a strategy for the entire region, Allied Force would have been one major operation in the Balkan's campaign. Bosnia as a previously executed major operation, and Montenegro and the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as planned operations would have collectively define the NATO Balkans campaign.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It includes employing military forces and arranging their efforts in time, space and purpose. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle.³

Proper campaign planning can begin once the political leadership defines the Desired Endstate (DES). For the military it becomes a backward planning process. The DES defines the environment as it relates to the; political, military, economic, social, ethnic, and other conditions after the strategic military objectives have been accomplished. Theoretically, strategic guidance leads to national strategic objectives and ultimately theatre strategic objectives. A theatre commander, with approved strategic and theatre objectives, conducts an estimate of the situation and determines the methods to accomplish the objectives. A critical due out from the estimate process is the identification of the enemy's critical factors and the determination of centers of gravity (COG), for each objective, at the strategic and operational level. Additional key elements of the operational design include; the direction/axis of attack, operational scheme of maneuver and deception plan.⁴

Objectives

The shortcomings of Operation Allied Force began and arguably ended with the planning process. It was politically constrained from start to finish. A clear and achievable DES was never provided and the theatre commander (SACEUR) was given "ambiguous, poorly articulated, and unrealistic" strategic guidance by U.S. and NATO political leadership.⁵

NATO leaders and President Clinton derailed planning from the beginning when they declared that no ground troops were planned for the operation.

A policy decision that handcuffed the war fighters. The resulting failure to allow planning for a land component strongly influenced subsequent operations.

Execution will be compromised when there are no air-land synergies on the operational level. Neither the United States nor NATO was willing to consider a ground attack into Kosovo.

The practical effect was that the enemy could tailor countermeasures and tactics to minimize the effects on air attack alone.⁶

Instead of conducting a combined joint operation that leveraged land, air and sea capabilities synchronized in time and space, Allied Force became a series of air strikes and attacks with little surprise and no deception. It became a targeting war, micro-managed at the highest level. It was a gross violation of our operational doctrine.

Sound sequencing and synchronization of all military and nonmilitary sources of power are necessary to accomplish strategic or operational objectives in a given theater through major operations and campaigns.⁷

According to Carl Von Clausewitz, "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means."⁸ In Operation Allied Force, the indistinct policy that changed as the operation evolved, significantly limited the available ways and means and impeded operational planning and execution.

Goals and the corresponding objectives were never clearly outlined when contingency planning began. Once stated, they were changed during the course of the air offensive. The number of objectives varied from

five from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to three from the President to two from the SECDEF.⁹ The strategic objectives of NATO, as disseminated by the United States; (1) Demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to Belgrade's aggression in the Balkans; (2) Deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians; (3) Create the conditions to reverse ethnic cleansing; (4) Damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread war to its neighbors¹⁰; differed from those released by NATO and the North Atlantic Council (NAC).^{11 12} The language contained in the various strategic level objectives was vague and significantly hindered focus during the planning process. How do you demonstrate seriousness?

The NATO and U.S. theatre strategic objectives contained similar ambiguity that was found in the strategic guidance. They should have been synchronized and more specific in nature.¹³

Operational Planning

Operational art requires commanders to address four key considerations when planning and executing a campaign or major operation; (1) What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced to achieve the strategic goal **(ends)**? (2) What sequence of action (scheme of maneuver) will produce that condition **(ways)**? (3) What resources should be applied to accomplish the sequence of actions **(means)**? (4) What are the costs or risks in performing the sequence of actions **(risk management)**?¹⁴

This paper has already addressed the shortcomings with the DES and the national and theatre strategic objectives. Common to all sets of objectives was the desire to end the violent attacks and ethnic cleansing directed against the Albanian people. Simply put, the end

state (**ends**) from military action was an end to the killing in Kosovo and the establishment of a peaceful environment, governed autonomously, without further repression. Analysis clearly demonstrated the need for quick action.

The scheme of maneuver (**ways**) was hampered significantly by the political constraint against ground troops as well as the restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE). The operational scheme was single dimensional--air only. Operational planners further limited their options through a narrowly focused plan, lacking in initiative and flexibility. The scheme, driven by an inflexible Air Tasking Order (ATO), was very predictable and resulted in the systematic employment of air assets that lacked variation in time, place, and direction.¹⁵ The incremental approach scheme prevented the application of mass--a principal of war, successfully employed throughout history. The initial focus for planning was a "mirror image" of the Bosnia model. Bombing in the fall of 1995 had resulted in the Dayton Peace Accords. It was assumed once again that air power would rapidly coerce Milosevic to negotiate for an end to air strikes. The detail of campaign planning consisted of a short duration air operation followed by the permissive occupation of Kosovo by a multi-national NATO peacekeeping force. If two days of bombing did not work, the depth of contingency planning was to keep bombing. General Clark and Lieutenant General Short (JFACC) were never in agreement regarding the strategic and operational COGs. Operationally, Clark believed it was the tactical forces in the field, Short felt that it was Belgrade and Milosevic's C2 and support structure. This lack of synchronization over such a critical issue as COG is inexcusable at the operational level of war.

The resources (**means**) necessary to accomplish the objectives were equally constrained by the "no boots on the ground" decision. Even with the "air only" option, planners failed to develop a plan with depth. If they had, they wouldn't have required such dramatic changes in resources in two and one-half months of fighting. Over the course of 78 days, the number of aircraft in support more than doubled from 366 to 912.¹⁶

The political restrictions are well documented. This however should not have prevented the operational commander from planning ground options. Operational planning began in June 1998 following the outbreak of hostilities between Yugoslavian (VJ) and Ministry of Interior Forces/Special Police (MUP) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).¹⁷ Elaborate air attack options were completed by early 1999 yet there was not planning for a land component.¹⁸ The designation of a Ground Component Commander (GCC) with an ARFOR or MARFOR planning staff would have been a prudent measure. It could have been a U.S. unilateral measure, conducted in secrecy, with a focus towards ground contingency operations. Ground planners are highly proficient in Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB) and at a minimum could have been of assistance during the air strike operations. In the end, General Clark obtained approval to introduce ground assets (disguised as additional air assets), when President Clinton approved the deployment of Task Force Hawk on 03 April 1999. The decision to stand-up Task Force Hawk was a long overdue move that arguably unofficially designated a GCC (V Corps Commander) with a planning staff. Unfortunately, United States Army Europe (USAREUR) planners weren't notified until 20 March 1999, four days prior to the start of air strikes, to develop a plan to introduce V Corps' AH-64 Apaches into the war.

The final step in assessing the operational plan and its execution is the consideration of risk (**risk management**). Political risk drove the planning and execution process. From the beginning the political theme was, no military risk equals low political risk. The prohibition on ground forces was NATO and the United States' political risk mitigation measure that guaranteed the avoidance of a messy, potentially high casualty operation, not likely acceptable by the American and European public. It had been only five short years since the images of Mogadishu, Somalia made world headlines. The incremental escalation plan for the volume of air strikes and high altitude flight profile were operational risk mitigation measures directed at holding the coalition together and reducing the risk to airmen. A similar cost-benefit analysis led to the decision not to employ Task Force Hawk attack helicopters. The risk management decisions employed by NATO and U.S. leadership clearly avoided casualties and kept the coalition together. Unfortunately for the Kosovar Albanians, they further impeded NATO's ability to stop the killing of innocent civilians, a scene that increased in magnitude with each day of additional air attacks.

Serbian police expelled more than 800,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and displaced nearly 600,000 others within the province, according to UN and State Department figures respectively....By the time allied planes began striking enemy forces in earnest, Milosevic's campaign of forced deportation was nearly complete."¹⁹

A risk mitigation measure that prevents the accomplishment of a theatre strategic objective (stop the killing) warrants reevaluation or there should be a change to objective.

Operational Art Assessment

The metrics (ends, ways, means, risk management) used above to assess the application of operational art to Operation Allied Force

clearly highlight many deficiencies. The fact that military action is a direct product of politics and political guidance is blatantly evident as seen by the numerous political restrictions imposed on the theatre commander. The challenges of coalition warfare, where decisions required the consensus of 19 NATO nations, further complicated the problem. Regardless of restrictions, it does not relieve the commander from maximizing available resources in the planning and execution of operational warfare. Ambiguous theatre objectives, tactical versus operational focus, predictable and unimaginable schemes of maneuver, center of gravity definition, and the absence of contingency planning are all areas that could have been improved with the sound application of operational art.

In the end, Slobodan Milosevic signed the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) and withdrew his forces from Kosovo. NATO forces conducted a relief-in-place with the Serbian forces and remain to this day. This review will not attempt to explain why Milosevic withdrew, but instead amplify the fact that it is a topic of significant debate without a clear answer. The perspective and opinion amongst the most influential commanders prosecuting the operation differ widely. General Clark believes it was the threat of ground intervention and that it outweighed the firepower of the air operation.

Planning and preparations for ground intervention were well under way by the end of the campaign, and I am convinced that this, in particular pushed Milosevic to concede...the Apaches, the corps-level headquarters, and a full Army brigade of ground combat power in Albania were enough to offset NATO's obvious, public opposition to a ground war and convey a powerful image of a ground threat²⁰

LtG Short believes that that the destruction of major targets in Belgrade and other cities led to Milosevic's capitulation. This belief aligns with the Denial Theory of Air Power application which postulates

that bombing select targets frustrates the enemy from achieving objectives and persuades him that further actions are futile.²¹ British LTG Sir Michael Jackson, the initial NATO commander in Kosovo, believes that the June 3rd Russian backing of the West's position and the urging of Milosevic to surrender was the single event to have the most significance in ending the war.²²

A final argument is that Serb military operations in Kosovo had reached the culmination point. Milosevic had achieved his objectives. He had conducted genocide to the maximum extent possible against the Albanians and those that had survived had been expelled and were now refugees in Albania and Macedonia. The KLA offensive in late May, supported by NATO close air support, no longer allowed his military and para-military forces in Kosovo to act with impunity and it was time to cut losses.

The importance of these conclusions is that they are inconclusive. We should not look back on Operation Allied Force and use it as a blueprint for operations of this or similar nature in the future. This leads to the final point of discussion on Task Force Hawk.

Task Force Hawk

General Wesley Clark campaigned long and hard before, during, and now after Operation Allied Force for approval to employ ground forces. It caused significant friction with leaders in Washington and Europe. According to Clark, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, "saw no chance of maintaining NATO cohesion if the divisive issue of ground intervention was introduced."²³ Clark reluctantly conceded since he couldn't show that an air campaign wouldn't work. The reality is that he didn't concede. Despite the objections of the JCS²⁴, Clark spoofed the U.S. and NATO leadership by selling the deployment and employment of

attack helicopters as yet another tool in the "air power" kit bag. This was a clear stretch. Attack helicopters are ground oriented and focused, merely expanding ground maneuver to the third dimension with greater speed and flexibility than ground driving systems. In Army doctrine, the Aviation Brigade in a division is referred to as the 4th Maneuver Brigade. They rely on the support of ground maneuver and fire support assets for targeting and survivability. A review of the Task Force Hawk task organization highlights this fact. An overview of Task Force Hawk assets is necessary before an operational employment analysis.

Task Force Hawk was a unique organization, task organized with Army assets to complement the NATO deep strike capabilities during Operation Allied Force. The force was built around the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter and its capability to interdict ground targets, day and night, during periods of reduced weather conditions. The force deployed to Tirana, Albania in April 1999 in order to conduct operations over Kosovo. The primary deep operations assets were 24 AH-64 Apaches and 27 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), capable of firing the Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). An additional 31 support aircraft including the UH-60 Blackhawk, CH-47 Chinook and C-12 fixed-wing aircraft provided combat support and combat service support capabilities to the task force. A Brigade Combat Team (BCT) consisting of one airborne infantry task force and one mechanized infantry task force provided force protection. Task Force Hawk was commanded by the Commanding General of V Corps, headquartered out of Germany. The Corps Support Group (CSG) provided a support package that included the normal transportation, engineer, signal, quartermaster, maintenance,

ammunition, medical, finance and personnel services functions required to operate an Army unit.

Once deployed, Task Force Hawk had the following missions:²⁵

- On order, conduct deep attacks to destroy enemy forces in the TF Hawk area of responsibility (AOR). The TF was to also support air interdiction through the targeting process.
- On order, conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)
- Be prepared to conduct offensive and/or defensive operations to defeat enemy attacks toward the TF assembly area or base camp.
- Take all possible steps to maximize force protection.
- As NATO and Serbia reached agreement on peace in Kosovo, be prepared to provide initial U.S. forces for the peacekeeping mission.

In accordance with Army doctrine, the United States Army Corps is the lowest level of command that commanders conduct operational level planning and execution. The Army's keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations, Field Manual (FM) 3-0 further define what constitutes an operational action.

...actions are defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives...actions within the three levels are not associated with a particular command level, unit size, equipment type, or force component type.²⁶

The Corps level AH-64 Apache battalions and ATACM long shooter artillery systems, that were the centerpiece of Task Force Hawk, are the systems a Corps commander normally employs to conduct shaping operations (operational maneuver) to set the conditions for the tactical fight. Their maneuver and firepower can produce operational effects. When employed in this manner maximum use of deception, surprise and integration with the existing protection of ground maneuver forces are an integral part of the plan.

The strategic (political) and operational conditions never existed for the employment of Task Force Hawk's Apaches as an operational maneuver arm during Operation Allied Force. The systems were

appropriate for conducting joint operational fire and maneuver, however the timing all but eliminated any chance of employment. Without surprise, multiple directions of attack, and a legitimate ground threat to occupy ground forces, Task Force Hawk could at best hope to achieve tactical effects. Apaches fired the first shots of Operation Desert Storm when they conducted operational maneuver beneath Iraqi air defense radar coverage to destroy an operationally critical air defense C2 facility. Its destruction facilitated the beginning of the Gulf War's major combined air operation. A similar scenario, at the onset of the war, capitalizing on the element of surprise, would have been the best application of this firepower during Allied Force.

Risk cost-benefit analyses along with the personalities of leaders were the factors that ultimately prevented the employment of Task Force Hawk.

The United States and NATO were unwilling to risk a high number of casualties. Crashes of combat and combat support helicopters normally produce catastrophic scenes. The safety and tactical threat to Apaches was high. The physical environment did not favor their employment. Rugged, heavily vegetated terrain is not favorable for attack helicopter operations. Aircraft were operating at the top end of their mechanical capability, heavy loaded in the high altitude terrain of the region. They were susceptible to small arms fire and shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles. There were more than adequate indirect fire support systems to suppress enemy air defenses. The Multiple Launched Rocket Systems (MLRS) and Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) were positioned to suppress target areas for all the proposed missions. However, NATO and U.S. senior leadership was unwilling to risk the possibilities of collateral damage and unexploded ordinance. The rules

of engagement were so restrictive that extensive lethal suppressive fires were not viable. "NATO pilots were required to see targets before releasing ordinance in order to avoid civilians in the target area. It got tighter every time there were civilian casualties."²⁷ The launching of unobserved MLRS and ATACM fires on templated enemy air defense locations was never an option.

The stand-off advantage of the Apache leveraged during the Gulf War in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait didn't exist in the rugged, mountainous terrain. The avenues of approach into Kosovo were extremely limited which made their attack options very predictable. The enemy could concentrate its defenses on ingress and egress routes. The Serbs were a thinking enemy. They positioned their combat systems in natural and manmade locations that provided maximum cover and concealment. They minimized mounted activities and leveraged dispersion to avoid presenting lucrative attack helicopter targets. With no threat from a ground force, they dispersed and remained hidden under foliage and in villages.

Authorization to employ the force directly never came for several reasons. The target set in western Kosovo consisted of platoon-size forces, dispersed and usually hidden under trees and in villages. Attack helicopters penetrating at low altitude would have been exposed to small arms fire, antiaircraft guns, and shoulder-fired missiles. Given the extreme U.S. and NATO unwillingness to suffer casualties, the risks were determined to be too great relative to the payoff.²⁸

General Wesley Clark never had the support of the chain of command; Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton, and Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer. He was never able to forge a supportive relationship...in his book, Waging Modern War, Wesley Clark makes it clear that he was not the Army's favorite son and had advanced to the position of SACEUR by virtue

of key, high visibility positions held, and not through nominations from the Army's senior leadership. He realized that he was a soldier never fully accepted by his own.²⁹ Finally, senior Army leadership was not confident in Task Force Hawk leadership and aircrew proficiency. The deployment was wrongly perceived to be unnecessarily long and two training crashes, resulting in two fatalities, did little to install confidence in senior leaders.

Conclusion

Future joint operations will present the same challenges experienced during Operation Allied Force. We see many of the same challenges in the ongoing operations in Afghanistan.

Analysts almost universally agree that below the surface, Operation Allied Force was an operation flawed in political and strategic direction, with a challenging political and C2 structure, that never applied the optimum means to accomplish the ill defined and constantly evolving objectives. Probability and chance played as much a role in the positive outcome as did operational design factors. It worked against a weak foe, a risk we should avoid in the future. In the case of Operation Allied Force we should make an exception and change based on a "success" from the past.

There were countless valuable lessons learned from the strategic through the tactical level. Most analysts agree on the key operational art flaws that need attention:

- An unclear definition of Desired Endstate has a negative impact on goal setting and objective development
- Clearly defined objectives are critical and an essential link for determining the enemy's center of gravity
- An operational scheme that lacks innovation, surprise, deception, and "what if" branches and sequels equals predictability and increases risk. Operational plans must exploit the strength of our joint air, land and maritime forces. Ground maneuver integration will almost

always enhance force effectiveness and result in advantages in position and/or strength.

- The principles of Operational Art apply across the full spectrum of military operations.

The Army learned much from the deployment of Task Force Hawk and the role it played in Allied Force. It was not until well after 10 June 1999 that much was written on the important role Task Force Hawk Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems (ISR) played in the targeting process. This link was especially critical during the KLA May offensive that exposed VJ and MUP forces that were rooted out of their safe havens. Unfortunately most attention was focused on the perceived slow deployment and the two Apache crashes. Most Task Force Hawk lessons learned were at the tactical level. Some key operational lessons:

- The Army must get lighter and leaner to achieve rapid strategic mobility—the Army is addressing this issue with the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) and the development of the Future Combat System (FCS) for the objective force.
- The Army must do a better job with its own Information Operations (IO) campaign. When Kenneth Bacon, SECDEF for Public Affairs, announced on 03 April 1999 that Task Force Hawk would deploy within 7 to 10 days it created a false expectation with the media and public.³⁰ The Task Force had an initial operational capability on 23 April 1999 that was in keeping with the timeline desired by the theatre commander.
- The ISR capabilities operating from Albania and Macedonia were proven as a combat multiplier for the theatre commander. Unfortunately the sensor to shooter link was slowed due to a lack of preexisting joint procedures to share data on emerging targets. Army Division and Corps headquarters should develop training plans that include interaction with Joint and Combined Headquarters.

Allied Force demonstrated the strategic deficiencies of not taking a joint air-land approach to military operations. The political impediments were real enough, but so were the consequences of adopting a lesser strategy. Key combat synergies derived from joint air-ground operations and the compelling force they can exert on enemies were not realized. Allied Force was a combined air campaign that never had the benefit of a truly joint command...Above all, a fully joint headquarters would have been better able to integrate Task Force Hawk, not to mention more ambitious ground operations.³¹

Endnotes

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⁹ Douglas P. Yurovich, "Operation Allied Force: Air Power in Kosovo. A Study in Coercive Victory," (Unpublished Text Article, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 05 March 2001), 6.

¹⁰ Cohen, Shelton, Joint Statement on Kosovo After Action Review," NATO Security Digest, No. 198, 14 (October 1999): 6.

¹¹ NATO press release, 23 March 1999. Almost simultaneously, NATO publicly stated that the objective of its actions was to help to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo by contributing to the response of the international community and to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political solution.

¹² Statement after the extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 12 April 1999 and reaffirmed by the heads of state and governments in Washington, D.C. on 23 April 1999. On 23 April 1999, the North Atlantic Council issued a statement reiterating some of the original statements and adding new objectives, which really were conditions for the termination of the conflict rather than strategic aims.

¹³ Vego, "Wake-Up Call in Kosovo," 66. Theatre strategic objectives. **NATO:** Halt the violent attacks by Yugoslav Army and Ministry of Interior forces by disrupting their ability to conduct future attacks against the population of Kosovo. **U.S.:** Degrade and damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic was using to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.

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